# Case

#### Nuke power is safe- decreases structural violence

Hinkle 2012 (A. Barton Hinkle, journalist, July 2, 2012, “Don’t Judge Uranium Mining in a Vacuum,” Reason, http://reason.com/archives/2012/07/02/dont-judge-uranium-mining-in-a-vacuum)

Should Virginia lift its ban on uranium mining? The question has generated a lot of heat, but not much light. Last week, this column looked at uranium mining in isolation, and made three points: ¶ The recent report by the National Academy of Sciences was too vague to be of much use, and the use to which it has been put by opponents is misleading.¶ Opponents of lifting the moratorium throw around a lot of numbers that sound scary but mean little.¶ The uranium industry in Canada, where more uranium has been produced than in any other country on the planet, has an excellent environmental, health, and safety record, according to a review of the literature by the Canadian government.¶ That last point is worth dwelling on. Among many other things, the Canadian government – not the industry, the government—says “uranium mining and processing workers were as healthy as the general Canadian male population.” And: “Radon exposure to members of the public from [government]-regulated [mining] activities is virtually zero.” And: "Do uranium mines and mills increase radon levels in the environment? No." And: "Studies and monitoring have shown that there are no significant impacts to the health of the public living near uranium mines and mills." ¶ Also: "**Studies carried out over several decades have repeatedly demonstrated that people who live near [uranium mines** and processing facilities] **are as healthy as the rest of the general population." And: “It is completely safe to consume fish, game and fruit from regions near operating uranium mines and mills.”** And just for good measure: “No increased risk to children living near nuclear power plants or uranium mining, milling, and refining sites was detected.”¶ In short, then, **there is very little to fear from uranium mining or nuclear power when considered in isolation.** But we must not consider the issue in isolation – because the **fossil-fuel alternatives are**, in fact, **considerably worse.¶** Just ask Joseph Romm, who studies energy issues at the Center for American Progress – a liberal think tank founded and run by former Clinton and Obama staffers. “There is no question,” Romm has said, that “nothing is worse than fossil fuels for killing people.”¶ He is not alone. In 2010 – admittedly, before the tsunami-caused disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in Japan – the OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency produced a report comparing the risks from nuclear power with those from other energy sources. It found that, “contrary to many people’s perception, nuclear energy presents very much lower risks. For example, more than 2,500 people are killed every year in severe energy-related accidents…. In contrast, there has only been one severe accident in nuclear power plants over this period of time (Chernobyl) resulting in 31 [direct and nearly immediate] fatalities.” ¶ The OECD says the total number of Chernobyl-related fatalities could rise as high as 33,000 over the next seven decades, “but we note that the OECD Environment Directorate estimates that 960,000 premature deaths resulted from levels of particulates in the air in the year 2000 alone, of which energy sources accounted for about 30 percent.” That works out to a 9:1 ratio in nuclear power’s favor. ¶ Then there’s The Washington Post, which reported – after Fukushima – that **“making electricity from nuclear power turns out to be far less damaging to human health than making it from coal, oil, or even clean-burning natural gas, according to numerous analyses.** That’s even more true if the predicted effects of climate change are thrown in.” ¶ How much less damaging? This much: **“Compared with nuclear power, coal is responsible for five times as many worker deaths from accidents, 470 times as many deaths due to air pollution among members of the public, and more than 1,000 times as many cases of serious illness, according to a study of the health effects of electricity generation in Europe.” ¶** But what about radiation? Well. According to a 2007 piece in Scientific American, “Coal Ash Is More Radioactive than Nuclear Waste.” **In fact, “the fly ash emitted by a power plant** – a by-product of burning **coal** for electricity – **carries into the surrounding environment 100 times more radiation than a nuclear power plant producing the same amount of energy.” ¶** Gerald Marsh concurs. Two years ago the retired nuclear physicist told Popular Mechanics, “The amount of radiation put out by a coal plant far exceeds that of a nuclear power plant, even if you use scrubbers.”¶ And again, remember: **All these effects are in addition to anthropogenic climate change, which environmentalists insist is the greatest existential threat facing humanity** – at least when they are not ignoring the issue in order to frighten people about the supposed perils of uranium mining.

#### Nuclear exceptionalism is a myth – inconsistencies and overriding factors prompt elimination of fissile material because of existential risks.

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First, however, let’s provide some context. As I noted above, it is fascinating that in the long history of military technological have/have not dynamics, the international politics of nuclear weaponry has acquired such a strong flavor of moral critique. To my knowledge, after all, one did not see Xiongnu politics emphasizing how darned unfair it was of those nasty Chinese Emperors to monopolize the presumed secrets of China’s bingjia strategic literature. Nor does the unfairness of Byzantine efforts to control the recipe for Greek Fire seem to have become a prevalent trope of Frankish or Persian diplomacy. “Have nots” have surely always coveted powerful tools possessed by the “haves,” or at least wished that the “haves” did not possess them. It seems pretty unusual, however, for non-possessors to articulate such understandable envy and resentment in the moral language of “unfairness,” and to assume that this presumed injustice should motivate the “haves” to change their behavior. This argument seems to be a curiously modern phenomenon. One might respond that the very specialness of nuclear weapons makes such a position appropriate. After all, while a local monopoly on iron swords may have given the Vikings some advantage in skirmishes with Native Americans in what the Norsemen called Vinland, such technological asymmetry was not strategically decisive. (Indeed, the Vikings seem ultimately to have been pushed out of the New World entirely.) If iron had threatened to offer the Vikings an insuperable advantage, would the Skraelings have been justified in developing a moral language of “have/have not” resentment that demanded either the sharing of iron weaponry or Viking disarmament in the name of achieving a global “iron zero”? I’m skeptical, but for the sake of argument let’s say “maybe.” The argument that nuclear weapons are “special,” however, is a two-edged sword. Perhaps they are indeed so peculiarly potent and militarily advantageous that their asymmetric possession is sufficiently “unfair” to compel sharing or disarmament. Such an argument, however, sits only awkwardly – to say the least – with the simultaneous claim by many advocates of the “have/have not” critique that nuclear weapons have no real utility in the modern world and can therefore safely be abandoned by their possessors. After all, it is hard to paint nuclear weapons as being strategically decisive and useless at the same time. (If they are indeed useless, the conclusion of “unfairness” hardly sounds very compelling. If they aren’t useless, however, it may be appropriately hard to abolish them.) More importantly, any argument about the destructively “special” character of nuclear weaponry cuts against the “unfairness critique” in that it is this very specialness that seems to rob the “have/have not” issue of its moral relevance. Unlike iron swords, the bingjia literature, Greek Fire, or essentially all other past military technologies the introduction of which produced global control/acquisition dynamics, nuclear weapons have introduced existential questions about the future of human civilization which utterly swamp the conventional playground morality of unfair “have/have not” competition. No prior technology held the potential to destroy humanity, making nuclear weapons – with the possible exception of certain techniques of biological weaponry – a sui generis case to which the conventional “unfairness” critique simply does not very persuasively apply.

#### Their arguments are wrong – their critique replicates hierarchies through effacing difference with generalizations of haves and have-nots.

Shampa Biswas, 2001, Whitman College Politics Professor, Alternatives 26.4, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3225/is_4_26/ai_n28886584/>

Where does that leave us with the question of "nuclear apartheid"? As persuasive as the nuclear-apartheid argument may be at pointing to one set of global exclusions, its complicity in the production of boundaries that help sustain a whole other set of exclusions also makes it suspect. It is precisely the resonances of the concept of apartheid, and the strong visceral response it generates, that gives it the ability to bound and erase much more effectively. In one bold move, the nuclear-apartheid argument announces the place of nuclear weaponry as the arbiter of global power and status, and how its inaccessibility or unavailability to a racialized Third World relegates it forever to the dustheap of history. It thus makes it possible for "Indians" to imagine themselves as a "community of resistance." However, with that same stroke, the nuclear-apartheid position creates and sustains yet another racialized hierarchy, bringing into being an India that is exclusionary and oppressive. And it is precisely the boldness of this racial signifier that carries with it the ability to erase, mask, and exclude much more effectively. In the hands of the BJP, the "nuclear apartheid" position becomes dangerous--because the very boldness of this racial signifier makes it possible for the BJP to effect closure on its hegemonic vision of the Hindu/Indian nation. Hence, this article has argued, in taking seriously the racialized exclusions revealed by the use of the "nuclear apartheid" position at the international level, one must simultaneously reveal another set of racialized exclusions effected by the BJP in consolidating its hold on state power. I have argued that comprehending the force and effect of the invocation of "race" through the nuclear-apartheid position means to understand this mutually constitutive co-construction of racialized domestic and international hierarchical orders.

# Wilderson

#### Violence is decreasing due to hegemony- DA to the alt

Drezner 2005 Daniel W. Drezner Associate Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University May 25, 2005 “Gregg Easterbrook, war, and the dangers of extrapolation” http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002087.html

The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were less than half as many wars in 2004 as there were in 1991. Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the extent and intensity of global combat is now less than half what it was 15 years ago. Easterbrook spends the rest of the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people are genuinely shocked when they are told that even in a post-9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars. That said, what bothers me in the piece is what Easterbrook leaves out. First, he neglects to mention the biggest reason for why war is on the decline -- there's a global hegemon called the United States right now. Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't understand why it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: the reason the "great powers" get along is that the United States is much, much more powerful than anyone else. If you quantify power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes. [If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.] Joshua Goldstein, who knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago: We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. The emerging world order is not exactly benign – Sept. 11 comes to mind – and Pax Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. But a unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world. The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the mail. The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a temporary reduction in war and war-related death. The flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony were to ever fade away. Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged by, say, a really populous non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and the spread of democracy are right out the window.

#### We should evaluate actions by their managerial consequences - rolling back the steady evolution toward multilateral world peace should be avoided

http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1230-05.htm Gwynne **Dyer** December 30, 200**4** is a Canadian journalist based in London whose articles are published in 45 papers worldwide. This is an abridged version of the last chapter in his updated book, War, first published in 1985. His latest book is Future: Tense. The Coming Global Order, published by McClelland and Stewart. by the Toronto Star The End of War Our Task Over the Next Few Years is to Transform the World of Independent States into a Genuine Global Village by Gwynne Dyer

War is deeply embedded in our history and our culture, probably since before we were even fully human, but weaning ourselves away from it should not be a bigger mountain to climb than some of the other changes we have already made in the way we live, given the right incentives. And we have certainly been given the right incentives: The holiday from history that we have enjoyed since the early '90s may be drawing to an end, and another great-power war, fought next time with nuclear weapons, may be lurking in our future. The "firebreak" against nuclear weapons use that we began building after Hiroshima and Nagasaki has held for well over half a century now. But the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new powers is a major challenge to the stability of the system. So are the coming crises, mostly environmental in origin, which will hit some countries much harder than others, and may drive some to desperation. Add in the huge impending shifts in the great-power system as China and India grow to rival the United States in GDP over the next 30 or 40 years and it will be hard to keep things from spinning out of control. With good luck and good management, we may be able to ride out the next half-century without the first-magnitude catastrophe of a global nuclear war, but the potential certainly exists for a major die-back of human population. We cannot command the good luck, but good management is something we can choose to provide. It depends, above all, on preserving and extending the multilateral system that we have been building since the end of World War II. The rising powers must be absorbed into a system that emphasizes co-operation and makes room for them, rather than one that deals in confrontation and raw military power. If they are obliged to play the traditional great-power game of winners and losers, then history will repeat itself and everybody loses. Our hopes for mitigating the severity of the coming environmental crises also depend on early and concerted global action of a sort that can only happen in a basically co-operative international system. When the great powers are locked into a military confrontation, there is simply not enough spare attention, let alone enough trust, to make deals on those issues, so the highest priority at the moment is to keep the multilateral approach alive and avoid a drift back into alliance systems and arms races. And there is no point in dreaming that we can leap straight into some never-land of universal brotherhood; we will have to confront these challenges and solve the problem of war within the context of the existing state system. The solution to the state of international anarchy that compels every state to arm itself for war was so obvious that it arose almost spontaneously in 1918. The wars by which independent states had always settled their quarrels in the past had grown so monstrously destructive that some alternative system had to be devised, and that could only be a pooling of sovereignty, at least in matters concerning war and peace, by all the states of the world. So the victors of World War I promptly created the League of Nations. But the solution was as difficult in practice as it was simple in concept. Every member of the League of Nations understood that if the organization somehow acquired the ability to act in a concerted and effective fashion, it could end up being used against them, so no major government was willing to give the League of Nations any real power. Instead, they got World War II, and that war was so bad — by the end the first nuclear weapons had been used on cities — that the victors made a second attempt in 1945 to create an international organization that really could prevent war. They literally changed international law and made war illegal, but they were well aware that all of that history and all those reflexes were not going to vanish overnight. It would be depressing to catalogue the many failures of the United Nations, but it would also be misleading. The implication would be that this was an enterprise that should have succeeded from the start, and has failed irrevocably. On the contrary; it was bound to be a relative failure at the outset. It was always going to be very hard to persuade sovereign governments to surrender power to an untried world authority which might then make decisions that went against their particular interests. In the words of the traditional Irish directions to a lost traveler: "If that's where you want to get to, sir, I wouldn't start from here." But here is where we must start from, for it is states that run the world. The present international system, based on heavily armed and jealously independent states, often exaggerates the conflicts between the multitude of human communities in the world, but it does reflect an underlying reality: We cannot all get all we want, and some method must exist to decide who gets what. That is why neighboring states have lived in a perpetual state of potential war, just as neighboring hunter-gatherer bands did 20,000 years ago. If we now must abandon war as a method of settling our disputes and devise an alternative, it only can be done with the full co-operation of the world's governments. That means it certainly will be a monumentally difficult and lengthy task: Mistrust reigns everywhere and no nation will allow even the least of its interests to be decided upon by a collection of foreigners. Even the majority of states that are more or less satisfied with their borders and their status in the world would face huge internal opposition from nationalist elements to any transfer of sovereignty to the United Nations. The good news for humans is that it looks like peaceful conditions, once established, can be maintained. And if baboons can do it, why not us? The U.N. as presently constituted is certainly no place for idealists, but they would feel even more uncomfortable in a United Nations that actually worked as was originally intended. It is an association of poachers turned game-keepers, not an assembly of saints, and it would not make its decisions according to some impartial standard of justice. There is no impartial concept of justice to which all of mankind would subscribe and, in any case, it is not "mankind" that makes decisions at the United Nations, but governments with their own national interests to protect. To envision how a functioning world authority might reach its decisions, at least in its first century or so, begin with the arrogant promotion of self-interest by the great powers that would continue to dominate U.N. decision-making and add in the crass expediency masquerading as principle that characterizes the shifting coalitions among the lesser powers in the present General Assembly: It would be an intensely political process. The decisions it produced would be kept within reasonable bounds only by the need never to act in a way so damaging to the interest of any major member or group of members that it forced them into total defiance, and so destroyed the fundamental consensus that keeps war at bay. There is nothing shocking about this. National politics in every country operates with the same combination: a little bit of principle, a lot of power, and a final constraint on the ruthless exercise of that power based mainly on the need to preserve the essential consensus on which the nation is founded and to avoid civil war. In an international organization whose members represent such radically different traditions, interests, and levels of development, the proportion of principle to power is bound to be even lower. It's a pity that there is no practical alternative to the United Nations, but there isn't. If the abolition of great-power war and the establishment of international law is truly a hundred-year project, then we are running a bit behind schedule but we have made substantial progress. We have not had World War III, and that is thanks at least in part to the United Nations, which gave the great powers an excuse to back off from several of their most dangerous confrontations without losing face. No great power has fought another since 1945, and the wars that have broken out between middle-sized powers from time to time — Arab-Israeli wars and Indo-Pakistani wars, mostly — seldom lasted more than a month, because the U.N.'s offers of ceasefires and peacekeeping troops offered a quick way out for the losing side. If you assessed the progress that has been made since 1945 from the perspective of that terrifying time, the glass would look at least half-full. The enormous growth of international organizations since 1945, and especially the survival of the United Nations as a permanent forum where the states of the world are committed to avoiding war (and often succeed), has already created a context new to history. The present political fragmentation of the world into more than 150 stubbornly independent territorial units will doubtless persist for a good while to come. But it is already becoming an anachronism, for, in every other context, from commerce, technology, and the mass media to fashions in ideology, music, and marriage, the outlines of a single global culture (with wide local variations) are visibly taking shape. It is very likely that we began our career as a rising young species by exterminating our nearest relatives, the Neanderthals, and it is entirely possible we will end it by exterminating ourselves, but the fact that we have always had war as part of our culture does not mean that we are doomed always to fight wars. Other aspects of our behavioral repertoire are a good deal more encouraging. There is, for example, a slow but quite perceptible revolution in human consciousness taking place: the last of the great redefinitions of humanity. At all times in our history, we have run our affairs on the assumption that there is a special category of people (our lot) whom we regard as full human beings, having rights and duties approximately equal to our own, and whom we ought not to kill even when we quarrel. Over the past 15,000 or 20,000 years we have successively widened this category from the original hunting-and-gathering band to encompass larger and larger groups. First it was the tribe of some thousands of people bound together by kinship and ritual ties; then the state, where we recognize our shared interests with millions of people whom we don't know and will never meet; and now, finally, the entire human race. There was nothing in the least idealistic or sentimental in any of the previous redefinitions. They occurred because they were useful in advancing people's material interests and ensuring their survival. The same is true for this final act of redefinition: We have reached a point where our moral imagination must expand again to embrace the whole of mankind. It's no coincidence that the period in which the concept of the national state is finally coming under challenge by a wider definition of humanity is also the period that has seen history's most catastrophic wars, for they provide the practical incentive for change. But the transition to a different system is a risky business: The danger of another world war which would cut the whole process short is tiny in any given year, but cumulatively, given how long the process of change will take, it is extreme. That is no reason not to keep trying. Our task over the next few generations is to transform the world of independent states in which we live into some sort of genuine international community. If we succeed in creating that community, however quarrelsome, discontented, and full of injustice it will probably be, then we shall effectively have abolished the ancient institution of warfare. Good riddance.

#### Human life is inherently valuable

Penner 2005 Melinda Penner (Director of Operations – STR, Stand To Reason) 2005 “End of Life Ethics: A Primer”, Stand to Reason, http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5223

Intrinsic value is very different. Things with intrinsic value are valued for their own sake. They don’t have to achieve any other goal to be valuable. They are goods in themselves. Beauty, pleasure, and virtue are likely examples. Family and friendship are examples. Something that’s intrinsically valuable might also be instrumentally valuable, but even if it loses its instrumental value, its intrinsic value remains. Intrinsic value is what people mean when they use the phrase "the sanctity of life." Now when someone argues that someone doesn’t have "quality of life" they are arguing that life is only valuable as long as it obtains something else with quality, and when it can’t accomplish this, it’s not worth anything anymore. It's only instrumentally valuable. The problem with this view is that it is entirely subjective and changeable with regards to what might give value to life. Value becomes a completely personal matter, and, as we all know, our personal interests change over time. There is no grounding for objective human value and human rights if it’s not intrinsic value. Our legal system is built on the notion that humans have intrinsic value. The Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that each person is endowed by his Creator with certain unalienable rights...." If human beings only have instrumental value, then slavery can be justified because there is nothing objectively valuable that requires our respect. There is nothing other than intrinsic value that can ground the unalienable equal rights we recognize because there is nothing about all human beings that is universal and equal. Intrinsic human value is what binds our social contract of rights. So if human life is intrinsically valuable, then it remains valuable even when our capacities are limited. Human life is valuable even with tremendous limitations. Human life remains valuable because its value is not derived from being able to talk, or walk, or feed yourself, or even reason at a certain level. Human beings don’t have value only in virtue of states of being (e.g., happiness) they can experience. The "quality of life" view is a poison pill because once we swallow it, we’re led down a logical slippery slope. The exact same principle can be used to take the life of human beings in all kinds of limited conditions because I wouldn't want to live that way. Would you want to live the life of a baby with Down’s Syndrome? No? Then kill her. Would you want to live the life of an infant with cerebral palsy? No? Then kill him. Would you want to live the life of a baby born with a cleft lip? No? Then kill her. (In fact, they did.) Once we accept this principle, it justifies killing every infant born with a condition that we deem a life we don’t want to live. There’s no reason not to kill every handicapped person who can’t speak for himself — because I wouldn’t want to live that way. This, in fact, is what has happened in Holland with the Groningen Protocol. Dutch doctors euthanize severely ill newborns and their society has accepted it.

#### Ontology focus at the expense of action causes paralysis

McClean 2001 David McClean (philosopher, writer and business consultant, conducted graduate work in philosophy at NYU) 2001 “The cultural left and the limits of social hope” http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm

There is a lot of philosophical prose on the general subject of social justice. Some of this is quite good, and some of it is quite bad. What distinguishes the good from the bad is not merely the level of erudition. Displays of high erudition are gratuitously reflected in much of the writing by those, for example, still clinging to Marxian ontology and is often just a useful smokescreen which shrouds a near total disconnect from empirical reality. This kind of political writing likes to make a lot of references to other obscure, jargon-laden essays and tedious books written by other true believers - the crowd that takes the fusion of Marxian and Freudian private fantasies seriously. Nor is it the lack of scholarship that makes this prose bad. Much of it is well "supported" by footnotes referencing a lode of other works, some of which are actually quite good. Rather, what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of relevance to extant and critical policy debates, the passage of actual laws, and the amendment of existing regulations that might actually do some good for someone else. The writers of this bad prose are too interested in our arrival at some social place wherein we will finally emerge from our "inauthentic" state into something called "reality." Most of this stuff, of course, comes from those steeped in the Continental tradition (particularly post-Kant). While that tradition has much to offer and has helped shape my own philosophical sensibilities, it is anything but useful when it comes to truly relevant philosophical analysis, and no self-respecting Pragmatist can really take seriously the strong poetry of formations like "authenticity looming on the ever remote horizons of fetishization." What Pragmatists see instead is the hope that we can fix some of the social ills that face us if we treat policy and reform as more important than Spirit and Utopia.

#### Calculation is good and doesn’t devalue life

Revesz 2008 Richard L. Revesz (Dean and Lawrence King Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, JD Yale Law School) and Michael A Livermore. (JD NYU School of Law, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Integrity, and Managing director of the NYU Law Review). Retaking Rationality How Cots-Benefit Analysis Can Better protect the Environment and Our Health. 2008. P. 1-4.

Governmental decisions are also fundamentally different from personal decisions in that they often affect people in the aggregate. In our individual lives, we come into contact with at least some of the consequences of our decisions. If we fail to consult a map, we pay the price: losing valuable time driving around in circles and listening to the complaints of our passengers. We are constantly confronted with the consequences of the choices that we have made. Not so for governments, however, which exercise authority by making decisions at a distance. Perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of governmental decisions is that they require a special kind of compassion—one that can seem, at first glance, cold and calculating, the antithesis of empathy. The aggregate and complex nature of governmental decisions does not address people as human beings, with concerns and interests, families and emotional relationships, secrets and sorrows. Rather, people are numbers stacked in a column or points on a graph, described not through their individual stories of triumph and despair, but by equations, functions, and dose-response curves. The language of governmental decisionmaking can seem to—and to a certain extent does—ignore what makes individuals unique and morally important. But, although the language of bureaucratic decisionmaking can be dehumanizing, it is also a prerequisite for the kind of compassion that is needed in contemporary society. Elaine Scarry has developed a comparison between individual compassion and statistical compassion.' Individual compassion is familiar—when we see a person suffering, or hear the story of some terrible tragedy, we are moved to take action. Statistical compassion seems foreign—we hear only a string of numbers but must comprehend "the concrete realities embedded there."' Individual compassion derives from our social nature, and may be hardwired directly into the human brain.' Statistical compassion calls on us to use our higher reasoning power to extend our natural compassion to the task of solving more abstract—but no less real—problems. Because compassion is not just about making us feel better—which we could do as easily by forgetting about a problem as by addressing it—we have a responsibility to make the best decisions that we can. This book argues that cost-benefit analysis, properly conducted, can improve environmental and public health policy. Cost-benefit analysis—the translation of human lives and acres of forest into the language of dollars and cents—can seem harsh and impersonal. But such an approach is also necessary to improve the quality of decisions that regulators make. Saving the most lives, and best protecting the quality of our environment and our health—in short, exercising our compassion most effectively—requires us to step back and use our best analytic tools. Sometimes, in order to save a life, we need to treat a person like a number. This is the challenge of statistical compassion. This book is about making good decisions. It focuses on the area of environmental, health and safety regulation. These regulations have been the source of numerous and hard-fought controversies over the past several decades, particularly at the federal level. Reaching the right decisions in the areas of environmental protection, increasing safety, and improving public health is clearly of high importance. Although it is admirable (and fashionable) for people to buy green or avoid products made in sweatshops, efforts taken at the individual level are not enough to address the pressing problems we face—there is a vital role for government in tackling these issues, and sound collective decisions concerning regulation are needed. There is a temptation to rely on gut-level decisionmaking in order to avoid economic analysis, which, to many, is a foreign language on top of seeming cold and unsympathetic. For government to make good decisions, however, it cannot abandon reasoned analysis. Because of the complex nature of governmental decisions, we have no choice but to deploy complex analytic tools in order to make the best choices possible. Failing to use these tools, which amounts to abandoning our duties to one another, is not a legitimate response. Rather, we must exercise statistical compassion by recognizing what numbers of lives saved represent: living and breathing human beings, unique, with rich inner lives and an interlocking web of emotional relationships. The acres of a forest can be tallied up in a chart, but that should not blind us to the beauty of a single stand of trees. We need to use complex tools to make good decisions while simultaneously remembering that we are not engaging in abstract exercises, but that we are having real effects on people and the environment. In our personal lives, it would be unwise not to shop around for the best price when making a major purchase, or to fail to think through our options when making a major life decision. It is equally foolish for government to fail to fully examine alternative policies when making regulatory decisions with life-or-death consequences. This reality has been recognized by four successive presidential administrations. Since 1981, the cost-benefit analysis of major regulations has been required by presidential order. Over the past twenty-five years, however, environmental and other progressive groups have declined to participate in the key governmental proceedings concerning the cost-benefit analysis of federal regulations, instead preferring to criticize the technique from the outside. The resulting asymmetry in political participation has had profound negative consequences, both for the state of federal regulation and for the technique of cost-benefit analysis itself. Ironically, this state of affairs has left progressives open to the charge of rejecting reason, when in fact strong environmental and public health pro-grams are often justified by cost-benefit analysis. It is time for progressive groups, as well as ordinary citizens, to retake the high ground by embracing and reforming cost-benefit analysis. The difference between being unthinking—failing to use the best tools to analyze policy—and unfeeling—making decisions without compassion—is unimportant: Both lead to bad policy. Calamities can result from the failure to use either emotion or reason. Our emotions provide us with the grounding for our principles, our innate interconnectedness, and our sense of obligation to others. We use our powers of reason to build on that emotional foundation, and act effectively to bring about a better world.

#### This debate matters –

#### use your ballot to stand in solidarity with the plan as a method to resist the possibility of nuclear war – this spillsover

HNSG (Harvard Nuclear Study Group – Albert Carnesale, UCLA Chancellor Emeritus and holds professorial appointments in UCLA’s School of Public Affairs and Henry Samueli School of Engineering and Applied Science, twenty-three year tenure at Harvard University , Pauly Doty, Founder and Director Emeritus of the Center for Science and International Affairs and Mallinckrodt Professor of Biochemistry, and an emeritus member of the BCSIA Board of Directors, Stanley Hoffmann, the Paul and Catherine Buttenweiser University Professor at Harvard University, Samuel Huntington, was an associate professor of government at Columbia University where he was also Deputy Director of The Institute for War and Peace Studies, Joseph Nye, University Distinguished Service Professor, and former Dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard, and Scott Sagan, Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute) 1983 “Living With Nuclear Weapons” p. 10

Many citizens who are concerned about nuclear weapons policy, however, are deterred from learning more about it for two basic reasons. First, they think their opinion doesn’t matter. Many Americans seem to think: why bother to learn about these issues if no one in Washington listens to what I say, anyway? Second, some people, even if they want to learn more about nuclear weapons policy, strategy and arms control, hesitate because they think these issues are too complex for them to understand. Both attitudes are wrong. Individual opinions do matter. Each citizen is not just a target of nuclear weapons; each is also an actor in the nuclear drama. The opinions of the American public play an important, thought not always determinant, role in maintaining American Security. This is true in two ways.

#### Even if it doesn’t we still have an obligation to begin with questions of policy-making

jenny Edkins and maja Zehfuss1 Review of International Studies (2005), 31,p. 454-5

What we are attempting in this article is an intervention that demonstrates how the illusion of the sovereign state in an insecure and anarchic international system is sustained and how it might be challenged. It seems to us that this has become important in the present circumstances. The focus on security and the dilemma of security versus freedom that is set out in debates immediately after September 11th presents an apparent choice as the focus for dissent, while concealing the extent to which thinking is thereby confined to a specific agenda. Our argument will be that this approach relies on a particular picture of the political world that has been reflected within the discipline of international relations, a picture of a world of sovereign states. We have a responsibility as scholars; we are not insulated from the policy world. What we discuss may not, and indeed does not, have a direct impact on what happens in the policy world, this is clear, but our writings and our teaching do have an input in terms of the creation and reproduction of pictures of the world that inform policy and set the contours of policy debates.21 Moreover, the discipline within which we are situated is one which depends itself on a particular view of the world – a view that sees the international as a realm of politics distinct from the domestic – the same view of the world as the one that underpins thinking on security and defence in the US administration.22 In this article then we develop an analysis of the ways in which thinking in terms of international relations and a system of states forecloses certain possibilities from the start, and how it might look to think about politics and the international differently.

#### Policy relevance is a pre-requisite to emancipation – purely theoretical focus ensures domination by current policy elites

Jeroen Gunning (lecturer in international politics at the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales) 2007 “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?” Blackwell Synergy

The notion of emancipation also crystallizes the need for policy engagement. For, unless a ‘critical’ field seeks to be policy relevant, which, as Cox rightly observes, means combining ‘critical’ and ‘problem-solving’ approaches, it does not fulfil its ‘emancipatory’ potential.94 One of the temptations of ‘critical’ approaches is to remain mired in critique and deconstruction without moving beyond this to reconstruction and policy relevance.95 Vital as such critiques are, the challenge of a critically constituted field is also to engage with policy makers – and ‘terrorists’ – and work towards the realization of new paradigms, new practices, and a transformation, however modestly, of political structures. That, after all, is the original meaning of the notion of ‘immanent critique’ that has historically underpinned the ‘critical’ project and which, in Booth's words, involves ‘the discovery of the latent potentials in situations on which to build political and social progress’, as opposed to putting forward utopian arguments that are not realizable. Or, as Booth wryly observes, ‘this means building with one's feet firmly on the ground, not constructing castles in the air’ and asking ‘what it means for real people in real places’.96 Rather than simply critiquing the status quo, or noting the problems that come from an un-problematized acceptance of the state, a ‘critical’ approach must, in my view, also concern itself with offering concrete alternatives. Even while historicizing the state and oppositional violence, and challenging the state's role in reproducing oppositional violence, it must wrestle with the fact that ‘the concept of the modern state and sovereignty embodies a coherent response to many of the central problems of political life’, and in particular to ‘the place of violence in political life’. Even while ‘de-essentializing and deconstructing claims about security’, it must concern itself with ‘how security is to be redefined’, and in particular on what theoretical basis.97 Whether because those critical of the status quo are wary of becoming co-opted by the structures of power (and their emphasis on instrumental rationality),98 or because policy makers have, for obvious reasons (including the failure of many ‘critical’ scholars to offer policy relevant advice), a greater affinity with ‘traditional’ scholars, the role of ‘expert adviser’ is more often than not filled by ‘traditional’ scholars.99 The result is that policy makers are insufficiently challenged to question the basis of their policies and develop new policies based on immanent critiques. A notable exception is the readiness of European Union officials to enlist the services of both ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ scholars to advise the EU on how better to understand processes of radicalization.100 But this would have been impossible if more critically oriented scholars such as Horgan and Silke had not been ready to cooperate with the EU. Striving to be policy relevant does not mean that one has to accept the validity of the term ‘terrorism’ or stop investigating the political interests behind it. Nor does it mean that each piece of research must have policy relevance or that one has to limit one's research to what is relevant for the state, since the ‘critical turn’ implies a move beyond state-centric perspectives. End-users could, and should, thus include both state and non-state actors such as the Foreign Office and the Muslim Council of Britain and Hizb ut-Tahrir; the Northern Ireland Office and the IRA and the Ulster Unionists; the Israeli government and Hamas and Fatah (as long as the overarching principle is to reduce the political use of terror, whoever the perpetrator). It does mean, though, that a critically constituted field must work hard to bring together all the fragmented voices from beyond the ‘terrorism field’, to maximize both the field's rigour and its policy relevance. Whether a critically constituted ‘terrorism studies’ will attract the fragmented voices from outside the field depends largely on how broadly the term ‘critical’ is defined. Those who assume ‘critical’ to mean ‘Critical Theory’ or ‘poststructuralist’ may not feel comfortable identifying with it if they do not themselves subscribe to such a narrowly defined ‘critical’ approach. Rather, to maximize its inclusiveness, I would follow Williams and Krause's approach to ‘critical security studies’, which they define simply as bringing together ‘many perspectives that have been considered outside of the mainstream of the discipline’.101 This means refraining from establishing new criteria of inclusion/exclusion beyond the (normative) expectation that scholars self-reflexively question their conceptual framework, the origins of this framework, their methodologies and dichotomies; and that they historicize both the state and ‘terrorism’, and consider the security and context of all, which implies among other things an attempt at empathy and cross-cultural understanding.102

#### The ethical practice of prediction and prevention builds communal ties and energizes a citizen base capable of pressuring for real solutions to extinction\*\*\*

Fuyuki Kurasawa, pub. date: 2004, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight

Rather than bemoaning the contemporary preeminence of a dystopian imaginary, I am claiming that it can enable a novel form of transnational socio-political action, a manifestation of globalization from below that can be termed preventive foresight. We should not reduce the latter to a formal principle regulating international relations or an ensemble of policy prescriptions for official players on the world stage, since it is, just as significantly, a mode of ethico-political practice enacted by participants in the emerging realm of global civil society. In other words, what I want to underscore is the work of farsightedness, the social processes through which civic associations are simultaneously constituting and putting into practice a sense of responsibility for the future by attempting to prevent global catastrophes. Although the labor of preventive foresight takes place in varying political and socio-cultural settings – and with different degrees of institutional support and access to symbolic and material resources – it is underpinned by three distinctive features: dialogism, publicity, and transnationalism. In the first instance, preventive foresight is an intersubjective or dialogical process of address, recognition, and response between two parties in global civil society: the ‘warners,’ who anticipate and send out word of possible perils, and the audiences being warned, those who heed their interlocutors’ messages by demanding that governments and/or international organizations take measures to steer away from disaster. Secondly, the work of farsightedness derives its effectiveness and legitimacy from public debate and deliberation. This is not to say that a fully fledged global public sphere is already in existence, since transnational “strong publics” with decisional power in the formal-institutional realm are currently embryonic at best. Rather, in this context, publicity signifies that “weak publics” with distinct yet occasionally overlapping constituencies are coalescing around struggles to avoid specific global catastrophes.4 Hence, despite having little direct decision-making capacity, the environmental and peace movements, humanitarian NGOs, and other similar globally-oriented civic associations are becoming significant actors involved in public opinion formation. Groups like these are active in disseminating information and alerting citizens about looming catastrophes, lobbying states and multilateral organizations from the ‘inside’ and pressuring them from the ‘outside,’ as well as fostering public participation in debates about the future. This brings us to the transnational character of preventive foresight, which is most explicit in the now commonplace observation that we live in an interdependent world because of the globalization of the perils that humankind faces (nuclear annihilation, global warming, terrorism, genocide, AIDS and SARS epidemics, and so on); individuals and groups from far-flung parts of the planet are being brought together into “risk communities” that transcend geographical borders.5 Moreover, due to dense media and information flows, knowledge of impeding catastrophes can instantaneously reach the four corners of the earth – sometimes well before individuals in one place experience the actual consequences of a crisis originating in another. My contention is that civic associations are engaging in dialogical, public, and transnational forms of ethico-political action that contribute to the creation of a fledgling global civil society existing ‘below’ the official and institutionalized architecture of international relations.6 The work of preventive foresight consists of forging ties between citizens; participating in the circulation of flows of claims, images, and information across borders; promoting an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism; and forming and mobilizing weak publics that debate and struggle against possible catastrophes. Over the past few decades, states and international organizations have frequently been content to follow the lead of globally-minded civil society actors, who have been instrumental in placing on the public agenda a host of pivotal issues (such as nuclear war, ecological pollution, species extinction, genetic engineering, and mass human rights violations). To my mind, this strongly indicates that if prevention of global crises is to eventually rival the assertion of short-term and narrowly defined rationales (national interest, profit, bureaucratic self-preservation, etc.), weak publics must begin by convincing or compelling official representatives and multilateral organizations to act differently; only then will farsightedness be in a position to ‘move up’ and become institutionalized via strong publics.7 Since the global culture of prevention remains a work in progress, the argument presented in this paper is poised between empirical and normative dimensions of analysis. It proposes a theory of the practice of preventive foresight based upon already existing struggles and discourses, at the same time as it advocates the adoption of certain principles that would substantively thicken and assist in the realization of a sense of responsibility for the future of humankind. I will thereby proceed in four steps, beginning with a consideration of the shifting socio-political and cultural climate that is giving rise to farsightedness today (I). I will then contend that the development of a public aptitude for early warning about global cataclysms can overcome flawed conceptions of the future’s essential inscrutability (II). From this will follow the claim that an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism – of solidarity that extends to future generations – can supplant the preeminence of ‘short-termism’ with the help of appeals to the public’s moral imagination and use of reason (III). In the final section of the paper, I will argue that the commitment of global civil society actors to norms of precaution and transnational justice can hone citizens’ faculty of critical judgment against abuses of the dystopian imaginary, thereby opening the way to public deliberation about the construction of an alternative world order (IV).

#### Their perm answers demonstrate lack of alt solvency- Nothing is ever ‘pure’ enough for Wilderson – he has an agenda of propaganda and disinformation

Shane Graham (Associate Professor of English at Utah State University) 2009 “Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid” review of the book by Frank B. Wilderson III Cambridge, MA, South End Press, 2008, 501 pp. (pbk) 978-0-8960-8783-5. Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies

Vol. 10, No. 4, October 2009, 479–494

Were you upset, offended, or outraged by Breyten Breytenbach’s recent article in Harper’s Magazine, in which he took Nelson Mandela to task for all the failings of the post-apartheid administrations? If you were bothered by Breytenbach’s piece, I would recommend avoiding Frank Wilderson’s Incognegro. In it, the author recalls declaring in 1989 that Madiba would be of greater service to the revolution dead than alive. Throughout the book he repeatedly rails against ‘‘Mandela’s people’’ as agents for an accommodationist, neo-liberal agenda. He even recounts a speech he attended in 1994 by the newly elected state president, in which he stood up and grilled Mandela about plans for the Reconstruction and Development Program. This all culminated in 1995 with a phone call from a Mail & Guardian reporter who asked for a comment because ‘‘Nelson Mandela thinks you’re a threat to national security’’ (470). The book jacket declares that Wilderson is one of only two Americans ever to be a member of the African National Congress (ANC). An African American, he first visited South Africa in 1989 on a brief research expedition, during which he met the Tswana woman he would later marry. He settled more permanently in Johannesburg in 1991, where he was soon elected to the executive council of the local and subregional branches of the ANC. But even as he was holding aboveground positions in the newly unbanned liberation party, he was also working with an underground cell loyal to Chris Hani and Winnie Mandela, in defiance of Nelson Mandela’s decision to disband Umkhonto we Sizwe and cease all covert operations. In this capacity, Wilderson ‘‘gathered information on [visiting] Americans and worked on psychological warfare, propaganda, disinformation, and general political analysis’’ (276). From his position as lecturer, first at Wits University and later at the Soweto campus of Vista University, he was charged with capturing ‘‘as much territory (real and imagined) of the university-industrial complex before the ANC came to power as possible’’ (143). Wilderson’s perspective on the events of 1989–1996 is unique: he sees the seminal moments of South Africa’s transition both as an insider (as an elected official in the ANC) and as an outsider who never fully gains the trust of the party’s power structure. And whereas even a couple of years ago his condemnations of the ‘‘New South Africa’’ and its economic policies might have struck many middle-class South African readers as strident and delusional, the predictions he recalls making now seem undeniably prescient in light of the recent power shift within the ANC. After all, one wonders whether Jacob Zuma’s demagoguery would have ever found political traction had Thabo Mbeki’s wing of the party not succeeded in prioritizing laissez-faire liberalism above material reparations for the poor. Had Wilderson been content to write a political memoir of his modest but interesting role in the South African transition, it would have been a slender but compelling, occasionally even gripping, book. Instead, Wilderson gives us a sprawling 500-page tome that attempts to serve not just as political memoir but also as autobiography, therapeutic exercise, and character assassination against former colleagues, to whom he gives very thinly veiled pseudonyms. As an account of growing up black in the white United States, Incognegro offers a few engaging stories: he visited Fred Hampton’s house in Chicago at age thirteen, soon after Hampton had been shot dead by police; and he took part in battles with the police and national guard in Berkeley in 1969. Otherwise, though, the book’s representation of the black experience in America covers familiar ground and adds little to our understanding of that experience beyond fresh layers of indignation and rage. Worse still are the chapters narrating Wilderson’s life after leaving South Africa in 1996, when he moved to California, started a relationship with a white woman, and became embroiled in the cutthroat and frequently racist politics at Cabrillo College, where he found employment. These sections of the book, frankly, are irritating to read for their tone of alternating self-loathing, self-pity, and selfrighteousness. Wilderson’s incessant outrage may often be justified, but it just as often seems petty and juvenile. For example, he describes one ‘‘diversity workshop’’ at Cabrillo at which he feels ‘‘I’d like to behave but I’m bored to tears’’ (428); and he takes great delight in comparing the liberal ideologues at Wits to tokoloshes1 in an extended metaphor that the author elaborates for many pages. After reading such scenes, as well as many others in which Wilderson behaves basely toward the people he is closest to, I began to wonder to what extent his radicalism is driven by principle, and to what extent it is simply a legitimizing front for a childish, hyperactive obstreperousness. As the comrade who recruited him for the ANC tells him, ‘‘You have no sense of your environment, and you seem not to care’’ (135). Even his mother tells him that he has a ‘‘Classic persecution complex’’ (486). The difficulty of reviewing a book such as this is that the author would no doubt respond to any criticism (of the book’s tone, for instance, or of its clumsy, selfconsciously postmodern structure, which jumps randomly between time frames) by attacking the reviewer as a deluded quisling of the global capitalist establishment and ‘‘blah, blah, blah’’ (to quote Wilderson’s own paraphrase of Mandela’s response to his aforementioned question). In my pre-emptive self-defence, I can only emphasize again that it is this memoir’s narcissism and self-indulgent tone that made it an unpleasant read for me, not its politics. There is no doubt that the revolution let down a lot of people. But it was always going to let down Frank Wilderson because it seems that, for him, nothing can ever be pure enough.

#### Wilderson film based analysis is exaggerated, overly US-centric, and excludes the lens of gender – his thesis that Anti-Blackness creates ontological death is epistemologically flawed and should be rejected outright

Saër Maty Ba (Professor of Film – University of Portsmouth and Co-Editor – The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration) “The US Decentred: From Black Social Death to Cultural Transformation” September 2011 , Cultural Studies Review, 17(2), , p. 385-387, <http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/csrj/article/viewFile/2304/2474>

A few pages into Red, White and Black, I feared that it would just be a matter of time before Wilderson’s black‐as‐social‐death idea and multiple attacks on issues and scholars he disagrees with run (him) into (theoretical) trouble. This happens in chapter two, ‘The Narcissistic Slave’, where he critiques black film theorists and books. For example, Wilderson declares that Gladstone Yearwood’s Black Film as Signifying Practice (2000) ‘betrays a kind of conceptual anxiety with respect to the historical object of study— ... it clings, anxiously, to the film‐as‐text‐as‐legitimateobject of Black cinema.’ (62) He then quotes from Yearwood’s book to highlight ‘just how vague the aesthetic foundation of Yearwood’s attempt to construct a canon can be’. (63) And yet Wilderson’s highlighting is problematic because it overlooks the ‘Diaspora’ or ‘African Diaspora’, a key component in Yearwood’s thesis that, crucially, neither navel‐gazes (that is, at the US or black America) nor pretends to properly engage with black film. Furthermore, Wilderson separates the different waves of black film theory and approaches them, only, in terms of how a most recent one might challenge its precedent. Again, his approach is problematic because it does not mention or emphasise the inter‐connectivity of/in black film theory. As a case in point, Wilderson does not link Tommy Lott’s mobilisation of Third Cinema for black film theory to Yearwood’s idea of African Diaspora. (64) Additionally, of course, Wilderson seems unaware that Third Cinema itself has been fundamentally questioned since Lott’s 1990s’ theory of black film was formulated. Yet another consequence of ignoring the African Diaspora is that it exposes Wilderson’s corpus of films as unable to carry the weight of the transnational argument he attempts to advance. Here, beyond the US‐centricity or ‘social and political specificity of [his] filmography’, (95) I am talking about Wilderson’s choice of films. For example, Antwone Fisher (dir. Denzel Washington, 2002) is attacked unfairly for failing to acknowledge ‘a grid of captivity across spatial dimensions of the Black “body”, the Black “home”, and the Black “community”’ (111) while films like Alan and Albert Hughes’s Menace II Society (1993), overlooked, do acknowledge the same grid and, additionally, problematise Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP) policing. The above examples expose the fact of Wilderson’s dubious and questionable conclusions on black film. Red, White and Black is particularly undermined by Wilderson’s propensity for exaggeration and blinkeredness. In chapter nine, ‘“Savage” Negrophobia’, he writes: The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black ‘style’ ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process ... Anyone can say ‘nigger’ because anyone can be a ‘nigger’. (235)7 Similarly, in chapter ten, ‘A Crisis in the Commons’, Wilderson addresses the issue of ‘Black time’. Black is irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are ‘the ship hold of the Middle Passage’: ‘the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time’ but also ‘the “moment” of no time at all on the map of no place at all’. (279) Not only does Pinho’s more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous (see below), I also wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless historians’ and sociologists’ works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage,8 or of groundbreaking jazz‐studies books on cross‐cultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while dismissing jazz as ‘belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking’, (225) there seems to be no way back. It is therefore hardly surprising that Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti‐ Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film’s badly planned sequel: ‘How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.’ (340) —PINHO AS FRESH AIR: AFRO-MYTHS AND BLACK ATLANTIC IDENTITIES Pinho favours detailed and measured presentation of an idea, term or argument, followed by an equally in‐depth and careful critique. Her book is a breath of fresh air because, for one thing, Pinho knows that what blacks must breathe is called air and that it shall keep them alive. Metaphorically, of course, breathing means being aware that for scattered blacks Africa is not necessarily a nation‐state or place of return. Rather, Africa can be an ‘imaginary community’, (25) albeit one which entails mythic connections to Africa‐as‐place. Lucid and fair, Pinho unambiguously identifies and critiques such linkages through the myth of ‘Mama Africa’. Thus, Pinho focuses on what the term ‘myth’ means and three reasons for choosing it to study the blocos afro’s (Carnival Afro) reinventions of Mama Africa. VOLUME17 388 NUMBER2 SEP2011 Myth embodies the subtleties and power of narratives explaining and interpreting the world. Myth carries ‘values, messages, and ideals’ and is therefore crucial to dispersed peoples’ self‐produced stories and representations (2) while connected to and contaminating ‘reality’. (20) For example, Mama Africa generates and is in turn generated by identities, and only at the zones of contact between myth and identity can one hope to grasp its meaning. Bahia’s own version is a ‘metaphysical’ nourishing body at once ‘source of [racial] purity’ and ongoing dispenser of the essence of black life. (30) Bahia activates this myth through different means: music, aesthetics and religion (32–3); the blocos afro’s Africa as ‘the “place of origin” of Afro‐Brazilian ancestors’; and how it extends to countries in the African diaspora, such as Jamaica, Cuba and the USA, envisioned ‘as branches of Mama Africa’. (39) Crucially, Pinho notes that the Bahian Mama Africa does not own her body, while the myth itself echoes problematic representations of black womanhood. (30) Invoking such representations signals Pinho’s serious commitment to seriously examining blackness as diasporic. For example, she investigates the role agency plays in embracing Afro‐aesthetics (86) while arguing that a deeper meaning of such embrace comes from both an ongoing process of imagining and reinventing Africa (121) and that, in Brazil, adopting Afro‐aesthetics changes according to age, gender, geography and political commitment to ‘the black social movement’. (125) But what does the ‘Afro’ of Afro‐Bahian identities mean? Several things, according to Pinho: to embody Mama Africa through difference and by manipulating the body (89); tradition, for example, ‘rhythms believed to originate from Africa’; ‘purity’, such as the ability to remain faithful to African roots (90) or, as Nelson Mendes of the bloco Olodum states in an interview, to defend ‘the proposal of moving beyond boundaries’. (95) Therefore ‘Afro’ seems to signify an acknowledgement that race and blackness cannot exist separately while black identities must be mutable. (96–7) And yet, the blocos’ anti‐racist discourse keeps on retreating (in)to the body, and consequently undermines both the race‐blackness connection and mutability of black identities: why? Saër Maty Bâ—The US Decentred 389 —‘AFRICA’ IN BODY AND SOUL: PINHO AGAINST POLICING THE BLACK BODY Why? Because in Brazil the ‘alleged smell of the slaves’ bodies became an additional excuse for classifying them closer to animals than to humans’. (105) Attitudes resulting from this mindset permeate ways in which the body remains a place in which to re‐inscribe Africa as source of beauty and restoration of dignity. Additionally, nowadays black bodies are present(ed) positively in Brazil’s shopping malls, magazines, TV/soap operas, advertisements, and education. The blocos afro, created in the 1970s ‘under the influence of’ the US Black is Beautiful movement, can take credit for this presence’. (115) In other words, blocos afro develop a black identity through stories of ‘Africanness and representations of blackness’, an identity aligned with their ‘strategies of social promotion [connecting] discourse and practice ... culture and politics’. (117) It would be preposterous to talk about black Brazilians as socially or ontologically dead. At the same time, to take issues with Afro‐Brazilian activists’ and blocos’ anti‐racist discourse seems an arduous task. This is because it is grounded in engagement with history, place, federal and local government race policies (or race denials), and day‐to‐day anti‐black racism. Nevertheless, as Pinho rightly remarks, this anti‐racist discourse overlooks gender analysis: seldom do activists and blocos make reference to how ‘racism affects men and women differently’ while they fail ‘to question’ their own sexism, which leads to the female black body remaining ‘the preferred locus for performing the pedagogy of blackness’ through black beauty pageants for example. (136) Pinho objects to the policing of black women’s bodies, opposes notions of ethnic black identities and Mama Africa (158) at the same time as she finds linkages between biology, culture and politics problematic. Her suggested alternatives are most enlightening: one must remember that identities ... are constructed in the context of late capitalism, in which liberalism and discipline, coupled with bureaucracy, impinge on the most subjective conditions of identities ... we need to envision the possibility of constructing identities that are not based on the same terms that emerged out of colonialism and that circulated as a means to legitimize subordination and power. (175) VOLUME17 390 NUMBER2 SEP2011 —SOUR MILK AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION: PINHO AGAINST AFROCENTRISM Pinho’s above suggestions can be, but are not easily, achieved. At the time of (her) writing it was no longer a question of if, but one of how, to see the fusion of black culture with baianidade/Bahian culture. Aware of this issue, she suggests that we step out of ‘Manichean and superficial’ Afrocentrism so as to see the largely ‘artificial’ character of classifications ‘black culture’ and ‘Bahian culture’ and to take into account ‘the agency of cultural producers’. (198–9) Accordingly, I find stimulating Pinho’s courage to declare that to objectify identities does not necessarily create estrangement; without objectification cultures cannot expand and reproduce, (209) and cultural transformation needs to be promoted. In turn, to transform culture demands a re‐thinking of what equality means because: Equal should not be understood as same ... To see equality as sameness is like viewing racelessness as whiteness. It is a formulation that allows ‘white’ to be the neutral standard from which black differs; or ‘man’ to be the neutral standard against which women are compared. (220–1) Put simply, I welcome the above statement and Pinho’s overall thesis. I wish Wilderson paid attention to books like Pinho’s, Cedric J. Robinson’s Black Marxism (1983) or W.E.B. DuBois’s Black Reconstruction in America (1935), and to the ideas of Kwame A. Appiah, Cornel West, Marc Reed, Simone de Beauvoir, Eric Robert Taylor, to name but a few. Had Wilderson done so, his book could have been balanced. Red, White and Black is of almost no use to film studies scholars. I find it additionally useless because I believe that the USA is not the world’s centre, and that US antagonisms, related to cinema or not, are always‐already multiply outernational.

#### Racialized descriptions of society reinscribe same racial binaries- constitutes the subject around race

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(John, South Atlantic Quarterly 104.3, Summer, “Culture against Race: Reworking the Basis for Racial Analysis”)

These racial identities define the type of subjects that Visweswaran advocates bringing into view via ‘‘a conception of race which is socially dynamic but historically meaningful,’’ even though their objectification potentially risks contributing, unintentionally, to the current resurgence in sociobiological notions of race. Visweswaran’s approach brings race to the fore of critical analysis, but the problem is that it also risks reproducing racial thinking in much the way ‘‘culture’’ has been accused of perpetuating race. Herbert Lewis highlights the perils in efforts to articulate this broader sensibility concerning race.8 Where Visweswaran strives to reanimate the ‘‘richly connotative 19th century sense of ‘race,’ ’’ with its invocations of ‘‘blood’’ as a form of collectivity that encompasses ‘‘numerous elements that we would today call cultural,’’ Lewis cautions against a ‘‘return to the pre-Boasian conception that combines race, culture, language, nationality and nationality in one neat package’’ (980). And though the equation of racial identity with the forms of persecution and exploitation highlighted by Visweswaran is insightful, Lewis observes that, pursued further, this logic reactivates a concept that ‘‘indissolubly connects groups of people and their appearance with beliefs about their capacity and behavior’’ (ibid.).Given the criteria she lists, Lewis argues, ‘‘it follows presumably that we should recognize as ‘races’ all those who have suffered one or another form of ill-treatment. Certainly Jews would now return to the status of a ‘racial’ group (as the Nazis contended), as do Armenians, Gypsies (Rom), ‘Untouchables’ (Dalits) in India, East Timorese, Muslim and Croats in Bosnia and Serbs in Croatia, educated Cambodians in Pol Pot’s Cambodia, both Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi’’ (ibid.). Every similarly subjected group would be reinscribed and reidentified with the very terms used initially to distinguish them for exploitation and persecution. Dominguez’s concerns about culture’s propensity for ‘‘perpetuating the very terms—of hierarchies of differential values—that constitute the hegemony’’ seem equally relevant to this attempt to ensconce race at the forefront of critical social analysis. There follow interminable questions of subdividing and distinguishing such races. Visweswaran’s description of the processes that produce ‘‘Chicanos and Puerto Ricans as races’’ leads Lewis to ask, ‘‘Are these two different ‘races’ or one? Can rich, powerful, and selfassured Puerto Ricans belong to this ‘race’? Do Dominicans, Ecuadorians, and Cubans each get to be their own race, or can they all be in one race with Chicanos and Puerto Ricans because they all speak (or once spoke) Spanish? Can Spanish-speakers from Spain belong, too?’’ (980). The problem with formulating research in terms of race is that it becomes very difficult to proceed without reproducing various racialized logics that promote the notion that groups are essentially differentiated—experientially and in terms of innate capacities and dispositions—by race.9 This is a problem that Gilroy takes as a basis for his critique of ‘‘raciology,’’ which I will examine further below.

#### Wildersons argument denies Black agency and fails to come up with effective solutions

Saër Maty Ba (Professor of Film – University of Portsmouth and Co-Editor – The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration) “The US Decentred: From Black Social Death to Cultural Transformation” September 2011 , Cultural Studies Review, 17(2), , p. 385-387)

A few pages into Red, White and Black, I feared that it would just be a matter of time before Wilderson’s black‐as‐social‐death idea and multiple attacks on issues and scholars he disagrees with run (him) into (theoretical) trouble. This happens in chapter two, ‘The Narcissistic Slave’, where he critiques black film theorists and books. For example, Wilderson declares that Gladstone Yearwood’s Black Film as Signifying Practice (2000) ‘betrays a kind of conceptual anxiety with respect to the historical object of study— ... it clings, anxiously, to the film‐as‐text‐as‐legitimateobject of Black cinema.’ (62) He then quotes from Yearwood’s book to highlight ‘just how vague the aesthetic foundation of Yearwood’s attempt to construct a canon can be’. (63) And yet Wilderson’s highlighting is problematic because it overlooks the ‘Diaspora’ or ‘African Diaspora’, a key component in Yearwood’s thesis that, crucially, neither navel‐gazes (that is, at the US or black America) nor pretends to properly engage with black film. Furthermore, Wilderson separates the different waves of black film theory and approaches them, only, in terms of how a most recent one might challenge its precedent. Again, his approach is problematic because it does not mention or emphasise the inter‐connectivity of/in black film theory. As a case in point, Wilderson does not link Tommy Lott’s mobilisation of Third Cinema for black film theory to Yearwood’s idea of African Diaspora. (64) Additionally, of course, Wilderson seems unaware that Third Cinema itself has been fundamentally questioned since Lott’s 1990s’ theory of black film was formulated. Yet another consequence of ignoring the African Diaspora is that it exposes Wilderson’s corpus of films as unable to carry the weight of the transnational argument he attempts to advance. Here, beyond the US‐centricity or ‘social and political specificity of [his] filmography’, (95) I am talking about Wilderson’s choice of films. For example, Antwone Fisher (dir. Denzel Washington, 2002) is attacked unfairly for failing to acknowledge ‘a grid of captivity across spatial dimensions of the Black “body”, the Black “home”, and the Black “community”’ (111) while films like Alan and Albert Hughes’s Menace II Society (1993), overlooked, do acknowledge the same grid and, additionally, problematise Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP) policing. The above examples expose the fact of Wilderson’s dubious and questionable conclusions on black film. Red, White and Black is particularly undermined by Wilderson’s propensity for exaggeration and blinkeredness. In chapter nine, ‘“Savage” Negrophobia’, he writes: The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black ‘style’ ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process ... Anyone can say ‘nigger’ because anyone can be a ‘nigger’. (235)7 Similarly, in chapter ten, ‘A Crisis in the Commons’, Wilderson addresses the issue of ‘Black time’. Black is irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are ‘the ship hold of the Middle Passage’: ‘the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time’ but also ‘the “moment” of no time at all on the map of no place at all’. (279) Not only does Pinho’s more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous (see below), I also wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless historians’ and sociologists’ works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage,8 or of groundbreaking jazz‐studies books on cross‐cultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while dismissing jazz as ‘belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking’, (225) there seems to be no way back. It is therefore hardly surprising that Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti‐ Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film’s badly planned sequel: ‘How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.’ (340)

#### We have a better psychological explanation of conflict- Wohlforth evidence is based on sociology, psychology and a litany of other social sciences which should be preferred to psychoanalysis:

#### Their scientific data is methodologically bankrupt- multiple reasons.

-confusion of speculation with fact

-penchant for generalizing from a small number of imperfectly examined instances

-selective reporting of raw data to fit the latest theoretical enthusiasm

-indifference to rival explanations and to mainstream science

Every item has been conceded by psychoanalysts who are still unready to take in the total picture.

Crews, 2004

(Frederick Crews, Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley and a fellow of the Institute for Science in Medicine, Butterflies and Wheels, “Reply to Holland” August 10, http://www.butterfliesandwheels.org/2004/reply-to-holland/)

But how can Holland be sure that those results have been overlooked? One could not tell from his paper that he has read a single page of the revisionist scholarship and reasoning that have revolutionized our perception of the psychoanalytic movement and its claims of scientific validation. His 64 references include no dissenters’ texts; and only one dissenter’s name, my own, is briefly mentioned. Moreover, Holland’s characterization of my position, that I find all of psychoanalytic theory untestable and therefore merely “literary” in nature, is off the mark. I regard psychoanalytic doctrine not as literature but as partly unfalsifiable, partly falsified pseudoscience which, when it was widely believed, caused harm to people whom it demeaned, stigmatized, and misdiagnosed. [2, 3, 4; see also 5] Unfortunately, the facts and arguments that Holland ignores bear crucially on the question he proposes to answer: whether psychoanalysis deserves to be called a science. He could have learned much, for example, from the work of two major Freud scholars, Frank Cioffi [6] and Malcolm Macmillan [7], who have extensively traced Freud’s initial confusions and misrepresentations, the many unclarities and cross-purposes that have continued to plague psychoanalytic doctrine, and the chronic flight from exposure to potential disconfirmation that has typified the entire record from Freud’s day through our own. Science is as science does. If neither Freud nor his successors have shown a due regard for objections to their pet ideas, psychoanalysis is ipso facto not a science. Condensing the findings of Cioffi, Macmillan, and other knowledgeable philosophers of science and historians such as Adolf Grünbaum [8], Edward Erwin [9], and Allen Esterson [10], I have elsewhere put into one long sentence the anti-empirical features of the psychoanalytic movement [3, pp. 61n-62n]: They include its cult of the founder’s personality; its casually anecdotal approach to corroboration; its cavalier dismissal of its most besetting epistemic problem, that of suggestion; its habitual confusion of speculation with fact; its penchant for generalizing from a small number of imperfectly examined instances; its proliferation of theoretical entities bearing no testable referents; its lack of vigilance against self-contradiction; its selective reporting of raw data to fit the latest theoretical enthusiasm; its ambiguities and exit clauses, allowing negative results to be counted as positive ones; its indifference to rival explanations and to mainstream science; its absence of any specified means for preferring one interpretation to another; its insistence that only the initiated are entitled to criticize; its stigmatizing of disagreement as “resistance,” along with the corollary that, as Freud put it, all such resistance constitutes “actual evidence in favour of the correctness” of the theory (SE, 13:180); and its narcissistic faith that, again in Freud’s words, “applications of analysis are always confirmations of it as well” (SE, 22:146). This indictment is sometimes dismissed by Freudians as the raving of an unhinged mind. The justice of every item, however, has been conceded piecemeal by a number of psychoanalysts who are still unready to take in the total picture. And other previously sanguine pro-psychoanalytic commentators now grant that the Freudian community has shown none of the traits we associate with serious investigators. Robert F. Bornstein, for example, whom Holland repeatedly cites as a compiler of positive experimental evidence, recently published an article, significantly entitled “The Impending Death of Psychoanalysis,” in which he charged analysts with “the seven deadly sins” of “insularity, inaccuracy, indifference, irrelevance, inefficiency, indeterminacy [that is, conceptual vagueness], and insolence.” [11] Bornstein portrays a self-isolated sect that is not just out of step with the march of knowledge but incapable of understanding where it went wrong. In order for Bornstein to bring his revised view into full alignment with that of the revisionist critics (whom Holland is pleased to malign en masse as “the bashers”), he need only grasp that the dysfunctional attitudes he has listed are traceable to Freud’s own arbitrary system building, to his dismissal of the need to reconcile psychoanalytic theory with mainstream science, to his heaping of scorn on all who questioned his authority, and to his declarations that backsliders from his movement had fallen into psychosis.

#### They have conflated “experimental” with “empirical”—and, science is on our side.

-studies have been conducted by people holding a prior affinity for psychoanalysis

-they are riddled with confirmation bias

-signs of unconscious cognitive operations have been misidentified as evidence of Freudian unconscious

-replication by independent investigators has not been achieved or even sought

Its overweening claims met with no scientific consilience at all

Crews, 2004

(Frederick Crews, Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley and a fellow of the Institute for Science in Medicine, Butterflies and Wheels, “Reply to Holland” August 10, http://www.butterfliesandwheels.org/2004/reply-to-holland/)

It would be surprising if such an undisciplined and retrograde movement had received support from well-designed experiments, and it would be no less surprising if the critics of psychoanalysis had failed to address the experimental literature. In fact, Holland’s claims on both counts are false. An extensive body of penetrating and disillusioning commentary about pro-Freudian experimentation can be found, beginning with Eysenck and Wilson’s small masterpiece of 1973 [13] and running through Edward Erwin’s meticulous study of 1996. [9] It is apparent that Holland, who innocently equates the terms “experimental” and “empirical,” hasn’t pondered these widely discussed and important works. Yet if he had attended to no other writings than my own, he would have found me engaged in pertinent debate with several of the psychodynamically committed experimental authorities on whom he relies: Seymour Fisher, Roger P. Greenberg, Lester Luborsky, and Matthew H. Erdelyi. [2, 3, 4] As its scientific critics have shown, most of the research admired by Holland suffers from grave and obvious flaws. These studies, having been conducted by people holding a prior affinity for psychoanalysis, are riddled with confirmation bias and demand characteristics: Instead of testing psychoanalytic hypotheses against rival ones that might have fared better under Ockham’s razor, the experimenters have used Freudian theory as their starting point and have looked for confirming instances, which have been located with the same facility with which Holland once found oral and anal images suffusing the world’s literature. Terms have been construed with suspect broadness; strong causal claims have been reinterpreted as weak descriptive ones; and generous psychoanalytic rules of interpretation have helped to shape positive results. Freudian propositions have been assessed through the application of such questionable instruments as the psychoanalytically tendentious Blacky pictures and the Rorschach test, which already lacked validity before believers in Freudian projection twisted it to their own purposes. [14] (Holland himself twice appeals to psychoanalytic Rorschach findings as sound evidence.) Signs of unconscious cognitive operations have been misidentified as evidence of the very different Freudian unconscious at work. [15] (Holland’s paper indulges in the same confusion.) Replication of tentative outcomes by independent investigators-an essential requirement of experimentation in any field-has not been achieved or even sought. It is Holland’s countenancing of these lax and biased practices that allows him to proclaim that research “supports an oedipal stage,” that “the penis=baby equation” has been vindicated, that “links between depression and oral fixation” have been found, and that “Freud’s account of paranoia gets confirmation.” Such “confirmation” is a strictly parochial affair, and that is why it has been left out of account by scientifically responsible textbook authors. Critics of psychoanalysis hold that no distinctively psychoanalytic hypotheses, such as those just mentioned, have earned significant evidential backing. Freudians, however, typically credit psychoanalysis with having introduced broader notions that were, in fact, already commonplace in the middle of the nineteenth century. As the great historian of psychiatry Henri F. Ellenberger observed in 1970, “The current legend attributes to Freud much of what belongs, notably, to Herbart, Fechner, Nietzsche, Meynert, Benedikt, and Janet, and overlooks the work of previous explorers of the unconscious, dreams, and sexual pathology. Much of what is credited to Freud was diffuse current lore, and his role was to crystallize these ideas and give them an original shape.” [16, p. 548] It is only Freud’s novelties and unique adaptations, along with those of his most emulated revisers, that ought to concern us here. Self-evidently, support for ideas that originated elsewhere, much less those that express the traditional wisdom of the ages, cannot be counted as favoring psychoanalysis. Apparently, however, Holland does not consider himself bound by this axiom. Holland reports, for example, that research has validated such assertedly psychoanalytic propositions as that “much mental life . . . is unconscious,” that “stable personality patterns form in childhood and shape later relationships,” that “mental representations of the self, others, and relationships guide interactions with others . . . ,” and that “personality development is . . . moving from immature dependency to mature interdependency.” Insofar as these vapid truisms constitute the ground to which psychoanalysis has now fled in its retreat from Freud’s heedless guesswork, they illustrate the bankruptcy, not the scientific vindication, of his movement. In the second half of his argument, Holland seeks to confer respectability on psychoanalysis by assimilating it to sciences that enjoy unchallenged recognition as such. His reasoning here is notably fallacious. By progressing from single inductions to themes and patterns that are then checked for adequacy, he writes, psychoanalysts employ the same “holistic” method as social scientists and some physical scientists as well; and since neither psychoanalysis nor geology nor astronomy attempts to predict the future, “psychoanalysis is not that far removed from geology or astronomy.” (Nor, in that one respect, is phrenology or the channeling of ancestors.) Needless to say, a perceived or imagined resemblance between the data gathering in one field and that in another tells us nothing about whether their eventual hypotheses are comparably parsimonious and well supported. Holland labors to portray the psychoanalytic clinician as a scientist in his own right who cautiously moves from a theory-free study of word associations to hypotheses that make full sense of the resultant inferences. Yet he approvingly quotes a pair of experts who point out that the analyst “listens for noises that signify in psychoanalytic terms” (emphasis added); he further admits that “Freudians will see Freudian patterns” everywhere; and he adds that “Freudian patients have Freudian dreams and make Freudian statements and focus on Freudian issues”-thus providing the analyst, we may be sure, with more Freudian evidence for the confirmation of his Freudian hunches. Perversely, however, Holland still clings to his ideal vision of the tabula rasa clinician-scientist. Freud, Holland maintains, arrived at his theory in just this inductive manner, building hypotheses from sheer attentive listening in the consulting room. We now know, however, that this hoary legend, propagated by Freud himself and his inner circle, is utterly untrue. Far from suspending judgment as a clinician, Freud typically demanded that his patients agree with his theory-driven accusations of incestuous desires, homosexual leanings, and early masturbation. As a theorist Freud was a rashly deductive bioenergetic speculator who routinely invented “clinical evidence” to fit his predetermined ideas and who altered the facts again when a new speculation required adornment. Contemporaries accused him with good reason of having plagiarized some of his most basic notions, including repression, infantile sexuality, and “universal bisexuality.” When it proved impossible for him to deny such unacknowledged borrowings, he brazenly ascribed them to psychodynamically induced “amnesia.” [16, 17, 18] Holland’s illustrations of Freud’s supposed method show that he has not fathomed the cardinal difference between the first psychoanalyst’s actual means of reaching conclusions and his seductive rhetorical reconstructions, which offered the trusting reader sequences of ingeniously solved little puzzles that may or may not have preceded his theorizing. Freud’s subtle diagnostic skill as manifested in the Wolf Man case history, for example, earns Holland’s praise; no one has told him about the cunning fibs in that story that were uncovered by the psychoanalyst Patrick Mahony 20 years ago. [19] And in reading Freud’s famous “aliquis slip” narrative in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Holland takes at face value a (probably fictitious) young man’s narrated “associations” of liquefied blood and calendar saints. Alas, it has been ascertained that Freud lifted those and other references from a current newspaper article and worked them into a self-flattering and mendacious yarn about Sherlock Holmes-like psychic detection on his part. [20] Of course, the fact that Freud himself didn’t faithfully employ “the psychoanalytic method” doesn’t impugn that method in other hands. Yet it is impugned, as Adolf Grünbaum in particular has shown, by the circular procedures that Holland now dimly perceives to be a problem. Whereas Holland would like to believe that a clinician need only exercise “integrity” to avoid imposing his presuppositions on the patient, Grünbaum makes it clear that question begging in the therapeutic interchange is structurally unavoidable. [8, 21] Grünbaum’s demonstration is devastating to the claim, still advanced by Holland, that modern psychoanalysis rests on a secure knowledge base. “Psychoanalytic method”-the analysis of (allegedly) free associations, of dreams and slips, and of the “transference”-is much the same as it was a hundred years ago, and it is helpless against the contaminating effect of suggestion. That is why we see so many warring psychoanalytic schools, each boasting “clinical validation” of its tenets. Holland’s final misstep is to bracket psychoanalysis with plate tectonics and natural selection, which met with resistance until they were eventually vindicated by consilient findings. The fate of psychoanalysis has been exactly the reverse; it quickly won popular acclaim through its emphasis on taboo breaking but then gradually lost favor as its overweening claims met with no scientific consilience at all. It is that absence of corroboration, not “deep-seated prejudice” or the efforts of debunkers such as myself, that chiefly accounts for the moribund state of psychoanalysis today.

#### Psychoanalysis fails to generate real, substantiative change and only results in poitical quietism and passivity locking in status quo violence

Paul **Gordon** (psychotherapist living and working in London) **2001** “Race & Class”, v. 42, n. 4, p. 30-1

The postmodernists' problem is that they cannot live with disappointment. All the tragedies of the political project of emancipation -- the evils of Stalinism in particular -- are seen as the inevitable product of men and women trying to create a better society. But, rather than engage in a critical assessment of how, for instance, radical political movements go wrong, they discard the emancipatory project and impulse itself. The postmodernists, as Sivanandan puts it, blame modernity for having failed them: `the intellectuals and academics have fled into discourse and deconstruction and representation -- as though to interpret the world is more important than to change it, as though changing the interpretation is all we could do in a changing world'.58 To justify their flight from a politics holding out the prospect of radical change through self-activity, the disappointed intellectuals find abundant intellectual alibis for themselves in the very work they champion, including, in Cohen's case, psychoanalysis. What Marshall Berman says of Foucault seems true also of psychoanalysis; that it offers `a world-historical alibi' for the passivity and helplessness felt by many in the 1970s, and that it has nothing but contempt for those naive enough to imagine that it might be possible for modern human- kind to be free. At every turn for such theorists, as Berman argues, whether in sexuality, politics, even our imagination, we are nothing but prisoners: there is no freedom in Foucault's world, because his language forms a seamless web, a cage far more airtight than anything Weber ever dreamed of, into which no life can break . . . There is no point in trying to resist the oppressions and injustices of modern life, since even our dreams of freedom only add more links to our chains; however, once we grasp the futility of it all, at least we can relax.59 Cohen's political defeatism and his conviction in the explanatory power of his new faith of psychoanalysis lead him to be contemptuous and dismissive of any attempt at political solidarity or collective action. For him, `communities' are always `imagined', which, in his view, means based on fantasy, while different forms of working-class organisation, from the craft fraternity to the revolutionary group, are dismissed as `fantasies of self-sufficient combination'.60 In this scenario, the idea that people might come together, think together, analyse together and act together as rational beings is impossible. The idea of a genuine community of equals becomes a pure fantasy, a `symbolic retrieval' of something that never existed in the first place: `Community is a magical device for conjuring something apparently solidary out of the thin air of modern times, a mechanism of re-enchantment.' As for history, it is always false, since `We are always dealing with invented traditions.'61 Now, this is not only nonsense, but dangerous nonsense at that. Is history `always false'? Did the Judeocide happen or did it not? And did not some people even try to resist it? Did slavery exist or did it not, and did not people resist that too and, ultimately, bring it to an end? And are communities always `imagined'? Or, as Sivanandan states, are they beaten out on the smithy of a people's collective struggle? Furthermore, all attempts to legislate against ideology are bound to fail because they have to adopt `technologies of surveillance and control identical to those used by the state'. Note here the Foucauldian language to set up the notion that all `surveillance' is bad. But is it? No society can function without surveillance of some kind. The point, surely, is that there should be a public conversation about such moves and that those responsible for implementing them be at all times accountable. To equate, as Cohen does, a council poster about `Stamping out racism' with Orwell's horrendous prophecy in 1984 of a boot stamping on a human face is ludicrous and insulting. (Orwell's image was intensely personal and destructive; the other is about the need to challenge not individuals, but a collective evil.) Cohen reveals himself to be deeply ambivalent about punitive action against racists, as though punishment or other firm action against them (or anyone else transgressing agreed social or legal norms) precluded `understanding' or even help through psychotherapy. It is indeed a strange kind of `anti-racism' that portrays active racists as the `victims', those who are in need of `help'. But this is where Cohen's argument ends up. In their move from politics to the academy and the world of `discourse', the postmodernists may have simply exchanged one grand narrative, historical materialism, for another, psychoanalysis.62 For psychoanalysis is a grand narrative, par excellence. It is a theory that seeks to account for the world and which recognises few limits on its explanatory potential. And the claimed radicalism of psychoanalysis, in the hands of the postmodernists at least, is not a radicalism at all but a prescription for a politics of quietism, fatalism and defeat. Those wanting to change the world, not just to interpret it, need to look elsewhere.